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Abstract
We present a method to strengthen a very low cost solution for key
agreement with a RFID device. Starting from a work which exploits the
inherent noise on the communication link to establish a key by public dis-
cussion, we show how to protect this agreement against active adversaries.
For that purpose, we unravel integrity (I)-codes suggested by Cagalj et
al. No preliminary key distribution is required.
1 Introduction
Wireless communication is the source of many opportunities and challenges, one
of which being its confidentiality. A convenient way to achieve confidentiality is
to use cryptography, which requires for the communicating entities to detain a
cryptographic key beforehand.
We focus on particular wireless devices, called RFID (for Radio-Frequency
IDentification tags). These are electronic tags made of an integrated circuit
equipped with an antenna. The amount of computation possible in RFID tags
is somewhat limited, due to constraints on cost, size and power consumption of
such devices. For that reason, protocols involving RFID devices must focus on
the complexity of computation on the device side; which puts aside asymmetric
cryptography.
Under this constraint, even symmetric cryptography setting must be thought
thoroughly. A solution is presented in the context of RFID in [1], where the
authors use a public discussion over a noisy channel for two wireless devices to
agree on a key, and show how to realize such a protocol with low-cost tags. An
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eavesdropper listening to such a protocol would not gain information on the key.
As a natural extension of their work, we show how to shield a protocol of this
sort in order to thwart active adversaries. The additional tools required for this
additional protection are reduced to a minimal complexity.
In order to formally introduce the essential notions refered to in the rest of
the paper, Section 2 describes the channels that we use. Section 3 explains how
Key Agreement through Public Discussion works. Section 4 details (I)-codes,
a tool that enables us to protect the Key Agreement against active adversaries.
Finally, Section 5 presents our protocol for Key Agreement through presence.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Description of the Devices, the Channel,
and the Problematic
As it is often the case in cryptographic protocols, two entities Alice (A) and Bob
(B) wish to communicate securely over some channel, while an adversary Eve
(E) wants to counter their objectives, by either preventing the establishment
of a key, or by discovering the key so that the communication is no longer
confidential.
We focus on wireless devices. This means that they communicate using radio
frequency; a direct consequence is that all messages sent by these devices are
public. Moreover, there is noise over the channel. This noise can be caused by
1. physical causes such as interferences, Doppler effect, etc.
2. the emission of other wireless devices, that can be genuinely communicat-
ing over the same frequency, or can willingly emit in order to alter the
communication.
The presence of noise over the channel leads us to the use of Error Correcting
Codes (ECC) (that enable to reduce the noise). In other terms, we have two
formal channels over which the devices are able to communicate.
1. A noisy channel Cp that inherently induces errors in the transmitted mes-
sages. We here suppose that pAB is a non-null error probability describing
a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) between A and B. Moreover, we also
suppose that the transmission from A to E is done through a BSC of
parameter pAE which can be different than pAB. (see Fig. 1).
2. A noiseless channel C0 obtained by correcting errors over Cp.
Both channels are public, i.e. E can listen to the channel, send some mes-
sages, and even alter sent messages by adding noise.
The goal of this paper is to establish a key betweenA andB that is unknown
by E. Our constraints are for A and B to be low-cost devices, which means that
no sophisticated computation is allowed, and that we aim at very few logical
gates to implement the protocol. As we prove in Section 5, we do this by
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constructing a noiseless channel that detects intrusion of an active adversary, in
other words, a “shielded” noiseless channel.
Figure 1: The noisy channels CpAB , CpAE , and the noiseless channel C0.
3 Previous Results on Key Agreement
The classical approach to key agreement by public discussion over a noisy chan-
nel was explored by [1] to apply it on low-cost devices such as RFID. Their
approach follows the three steps of Advantage Distillation [2], Information
Reconciliation [3] and Privacy Amplification [4]. We recall in a few lines
the main ideas behind these steps.
3.1 Advantage Distillation
A and B first exchange noisy data over the channel Cp (for example, A sends
N0 bits to B, and B receives a noisy version of those bits). Then, by public
discussion over C0, A and B select N1 < N0 bits out of the N0 bits that were
first exchanged, in such a way that the average error between the N1-long bit
string owned by A and the one owned by B is strictly less than p.
Advantage Distillation is designed in such a way that the error probability
of the channel from A to B decreases more quickly than the error probability of
the channel from A to E (and from B to E). A notorious example of Advantage
Distillation protocol is the Bit Pair Iteration protocol; A and B send over C0
the parity of each pair of bits of the data they own. When the parity is the
same, they retain the first bit; in the other case, they discard the whole pair.
The distillation is made several times until the information sent is likely to
have been sent from A to B through a BSC channel Cǫ with ǫ small enough,
and the information that E gets was sent through a channel Cλ with ǫ < λ.
After k iterations, A and B share Nk bits with error probability ǫ.
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3.2 Information Reconciliation
After the step of Advantage Distillation, the bit strings that A and B own
still differ. Information Reconciliation aims at correcting these errors by public
discussion over C0. [1] shows how to modify the Information Reconciliation
protocol Cascade [3] to reduce its hardware implementation to fit into resource-
constrained environment. In a nutshell, the Cascade protocol requires A and B
to send the parity of blocs of data of increasing size, in such a way that they
can correct the few errors remaining with high probability.
3.3 Privacy Amplification
A and B now agree on a bit string S of length Nk with very high probability.
The aim of Privacy Amplification is to derive a shorter key out of the shared
data, on which Eve has no information. For that purpose, A and B agree on a
universal hash function from a predefined family of functions, and compute the
hash of the bit string. This gives a shorter key K which is the result of the Key
Agreement protocol; [4] proves that E finally does not get any information on
K.
For practical purposes, the Universal Hash Functions defined in [5] are suited
for low hardware requirements.
3.4 Summary
These three steps are well known, and enable Key Agreement over a noisy
and public channel. However, such a construction is only valid for a passive
adversary, i.e. when Eve just listens to messages that were sent over the air. In
the era of wireless communication, anyone can temper with the data that was
sent over a wireless channel, which is the base of packet injection attacks.
The rest of the paper describes our contribution: how to adapt this scheme
so that the key establishment protocol described above is resistant to active
attacks?
4 Integrity (I)-codes
In a wireless environment, there is no existing mechanism that prevents an
adversary to jam all communication between two devices. Indeed, a powerful
white noise can make a Signal-to-Noise Ratio as low as possible. Thus, our goal
is not to ensure that no one jams the communication, but to prevent an active
adversary to obtain a significant advantage against one of the devices. The sole
detection of an attack is thus enough in our model.
We therefore describe a protection system made to detect all intrusion at-
tempts in the communications between A and B, called Integrity Code. These
were introduced in [6, 7], and make use of physical means to protect the com-
munication.
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Integrity (I)-code bits are transmitted in such a way that an adversary can
hardly change a bit “1” into a “0”. Moreover, information is coded in order
to detect the remaining possible bit flipping: from “0” to “1”. Putting these 2
protections together, an adversary cannot modify a message without having a
high probability of being detected.
Remark 1 Our use of integrity (I)-codes enables us to fulfil the non-Simulatability
Condition introduced in [8].
4.1 Physical Transmission
The bits are transmitted using the On-off keying technique (OOK). Signal is
divided in time-periods of length T. Each bit “1” is transmitted as a non-null
signal of duration T. Each bit “0” corresponds to the absence of signal during
the same amount of time T.
As the elimination of a non-null electromagnetic signal is very costly, this
satisfies the first constraint: preventing the flipping from a “1” to a “0”.
Assumption 1 It is impossible for an adversary to alter the transmission of a
binary “1” using OOK.
4.2 Unidirectional Coding
In order to detect the flipping from a “0” to a “1”, information is coded using
a Unidirectional Error-Detecting Code [9]:
Definition 1 A Unidirectional Error-Detecting Code is a triple (S,C, α), sat-
isfying the following conditions:
1. S is a finite set of possible source states,
2. C is a finite set of binary codewords,
3. α is a source encoding rule α : S → C, such that:
• α is an injective function,
• C respects the “non-inclusive supports” property, i.e. it is not possible
to convert codeword c ∈ C to another codeword c′ ∈ C, such that
c′ 6= c, without switching at least one bit 1 of c to bit 0.
The “non-inclusive supports” property can be restated this way: if c ∈ C
is a binary codeword of length n, and supp(c) = {i ∈ {1, . . . n}|ci = 1} is the
support of c, then ∀c, c′ ∈ C, the supports of c and c′ are not included one into
the other, i.e. supp(c) 6⊂ supp(c′) and supp(c′) 6⊂ supp(c).
The Manchester coding which encodes bit “1” into 10 and bit “0” into 01 is
a very simple example of unidirectional error-detecting code. When combined
with On-Off Keying, its error-detection rule simply consists in verifying that a
codeword contains an equal number of symbols “0” and “1”.
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More generally, any binary immutable WOM-code (codes dedicated toWrite-
Once Memory) permits unidirectional coding. A Write-Once Memory is an ar-
ray of bits such that once a bit was set to “1” it can never be unset again;
immutable WOM-codes prevent the rewriting of a message on a Write-Once
Memory. To improve the Manchester code, which has a rate of 1
2
, and fol-
lowing [10], we suggest the use of the Berger code. To encode a word x
of length l, we add ⌈log l⌉ bits of redundancy in the following way: the bi-
nary weight w(x) =
∑l
i=1 xi is computed, and represented in its binary ver-
sion w1, . . . , w⌈log l⌉. The coded version of x is the concatenation of x with
w1, . . . , w⌈log l⌉, i.e.
(
x1, . . . , xl, w1, . . . , w⌈log l⌉
)
1. The Berger code works be-
cause if supp(x) ⊂ supp(x′), then w(x) ≤ w(x′), and supp
(
w1, . . . , w⌈log l⌉
)
6⊂
supp
(
w′1, . . . , w
′
⌈log l⌉
)
.
Remark 2 The idea of unidirectional coding was introduced by [11] in the same
context.
5 Key Agreement Through Presence
5.1 The Model
Here is the description of the model for which we design the protocol. It is based
on the facts described previously: communication between wireless devices is
public, any adversary can make the communication unreadable, it is not possible
to make expensive computation with cheap devices. Therefore, the following
hypothesis are made:
• A is a low-cost device with limited computation and memory possibilities;
• B is a wireless sensor i.e. a communicating device that has reasonable
computing hardware;
• The two devices A and B are in presence, which means that they are
communicating with each other, and not with a third party E;
• E can hear everything that A and B send;
• E is able to emit at the same time an electromagnetic signal.
This last item is the main difference between the existing protocols and the
following: we here consider active adversaries.
Definition 2 Let C be a channel between A and B, and E be an adversary
such that:
• Transmission of a message s = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n from A to B without
interference of E is noiseless.
1The notation a is the binary negation of a.
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• Transmission of s from A to B with intervention of E leads to the reception
of ΦE(s) = s
′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n).
• A failed transmission leads to a state ⊥ for A and B.
C is ǫ-resistant against an active adversary if except with probability less than
ǫ, ∀s ∈ {0, 1}n, s = ΦE(s) or A and B are in the state ⊥.
Such a channel is such that, after a transmission, either A and B possess
the same message s, or A and B know that the transmission was a failure.
5.2 Rewriting the Three Steps
As we mentioned it in Section 2, there are two channels for A and B to com-
municate. The first one is Cp, the second C0.
1. The messages that are sent over the channel C0 are error-less thanks to
error correction techniques. To eliminate an active adversary’s chances
of tempering with this channel, we add a fourth step called Integrity
Verification after the three enumerated in Section 3, described hereafter.
2. In the classical key agreement protocol, the channel Cp between A and B
(resp. A and E) is usually modeled as a BSC channel with error probabil-
ity pAB (resp. pAE). If the adversary is active during the first phase, then
the effect is an increase of pAB without a change on pAE . However, the
Advantage Distillation step finally leads to a new error probability p′AB
that is lower than pAE independently of the initial situation. Therefore,
thanks to the final Integrity Verification, an active adversary cannot gain
an advantage at this step.
5.3 Validating the Agreement
The final verification step permits to ensure that the key agreement protocol
was not perturbed by an active adversary. For that, the idea is to check that all
the messages sent and received by A and B were the same, using a protection
technique on the verification message.
Note M the set of all the messages that were emitted by both devices, in
their order of apparition. We expect B to continuously save M. At the end of
the protocol, A will send to the wireless sensor B the identifier of a function h
taken from a family of hash functions, together with α (h(M)) where α is the
source encoding rule defined in Definition 1.
To reduce memory usage, A can compute h(M) in an incremental way, by
xn+1 = h(xn||mn+1) with mi the i-th message transmitted over the channel,
and xi the hash of the i first elements. || is the concatenation operator.
We therefore suggest the following order for the global scheme, which is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
1. A chooses the hash function h from a family of hash functions;
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2. B sends to A a bit stream using CpAB ;
3. A and B proceed to Advantage Distillation, Information Reconciliation,
and Privacy Amplification;
4. A sends to B the identifier of h;
5. A and B do the Integrity Verification step: B sends to A the message
α (h(M)) where M designates all the messages that were sent over C0,
using On-Off Keying (over C0).
Figure 2: The global scheme, illustrated
5.4 The Noiseless Shielded Channel
We here deliver the statement made in Section 2: with simple tools, to achieve
a channel that is noiseless and integrity resistant against the intrusion of an
active adversary.
The channel designed so far complies with Definition 2, as this is expressed
in the following formalization: Let A and B be a sender and a receiver; let
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n, t1, t2 ∈ N with n ≥ t1 and t2 ≥ t1, h : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}t1 be a hash function,
and α : {0, 1}t1 → {0, 1}t2 a source encoding rule following Definition 1.
A emits a message s ∈ {0, 1}n to B using On-Off Keying, by sending S =
s||α(h(s)). At the reception of S′ = s′1||s
′
2 with |s
′
1| = n, B checks that s
′
2 =
α(h(s′1)). If this test fails, then B emits a standard message expressing failure.
If not, B uses the now shared key to validate the agreement.
Proposition 1 The scheme described in the previous paragraph gives a channel
C that is ǫ-resistant against an active adversary, where
ǫ = Pr
x,x′
[h(x) = h(x′)]
is the collision probability of h.
Proof.Two cases need to be considered : either E does not intervene, or E
tries to alter the communications. In the first case, we obviously have S = S′,
which also gives s = s′1 which was the desired result.
In the second case, note that, thanks to OOK (see Assumption 1), the only
action E can do is to change a “0” that was sent into a “1”.
• If E alters α(h(s)) into s′2, using the unidirectional property of α, the
equality s′2 = α(h(s
′
1)) is never achieved.
• If E alters s into s′, but not α(h(s)) then E wins only if h(s) = h(s′), i.e.
with probability less than ǫ.
This shows that the alteration of a message by E is detected with probabil-
ity greater than 1 − ǫ. Therefore the channel is ǫ-resistant against an active
adversary. ✷
In our application, an active E can alter the agreement on the hash function
h. If this happens, then A owns a function hA and B, hB. With this kind of
advantage, E must nonetheless changeMA,MB intoM
′
A,M
′
B, with the prop-
erties hA(MA) = hB(M
′
A) and hA(M
′
B) = hB(MB). Moreover, to successfully
interfere in the communication, an active E must change “on the fly” messages
that are sent by A and B such that the final hashes collide, with no knowledge
of the future messages to be sent, and with the constraint supp(x) ⊂ supp(x′),
i.e. E can only change “0” into “1”. This makes her task even harder.
Remark 3 Our new approach does not resist to an active adversary issuing a
low-energy DoS attack to invalidate all key exchanges. As mentioned earlier,
our goal is not to prevent DoS attacks.
6 Conclusion
This paper describes a method to establish a key with a low cost wireless de-
vice. Starting from the classical key agreement methods, we provide the tools to
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achieve the integrity mechanisms necessary in order to cope with active adver-
saries. Using integrity (I)-codes - a modulation method that prevents to switch
from a “1” to a “0”, combined with unidirectional coding, we add a fourth step
that detects intrusion in the communication.
This paper finally focuses on the computation cost so that devices with very
few logical gates can instantiate this protocol. Indeed, the device needs only to
implement a few functions for the protocol to work:
• A parity evaluator – for the Advantage Distillation and Information Rec-
onciliation steps,
• A universal hash function, for Privacy Amplification,
• A unidirectional coding scheme, for Integrity Verification,
• A binary comparator.
The universal hash function is here the most gate-consuming element, and can
be designed in roughly 640 gates following [12]. The universal coding scheme,
that uses a Berger code, only requires to compute a binary weight, and a logical
negation. For key length of about 64 bits, this can be done in about 320 gates.
Finally, the overall complexity of such a device is of the order of 1000 logical
gates.
This makes way for the production of large amounts of low-cost tags allowing
secure communication.
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